At one point or another, most firms will engage "auxiliary forces" - contract with firms for development teams - to develop software for them. If Machiavelli were sourcing software projects, he wouldn't approve.
"These arms [auxiliaries] may be useful and good in themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their captive." Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapter XIII
Machiavelli counsels the prince against the use of auxiliary forces in battle. An auxiliary is not the same thing as a mercenary. A mercenary is a hired gun, loyal only to him or her self. A prince engages an auxiliary when he arranges for another principality to supply forces. The members of an auxiliary force will be loyal to their leader. The risk to the warring prince is that the kingdom with which he has entered into partnership will change terms during or after the battle.
Thus Machiavelli favours the use of one's own forces for important work. It is easier for the prince to align his force's interests with his own interests, and subsequently count on their loyalty and service because everybody stands to gain the same things for the same risks. In the heat of battle, mercenaries are likely to flee, while an auxiliary is likely to seek negotiations that minimize losses. After the battle, the auxiliary is likely to seek negotiations with the prince who invited them into the campaign. (More about this, below.)
Of course, business isn't warfare. But there are some business lessons we can learn just the same.
In software development, auxiliary forces have their place, particularly for utility services sourced for utility solutions. Consider an ERP implementation, complete with code customization. There is a large, diversified sell-side labor market, many alternative sources of that labor, pricing is more formulaic, risks and success criteria are known to some degree of specificity, and the work is not deemed strategically critical (not when everybody has an ERP). This commoditizes the sell-side offering, which favours the buyer.
The sell side has power in utility work only in times of acute labour shortage, which gives the sell side pricing power. But tight supply doesn't make a commodity into a strategic resource; it simply makes it a more expensive commodity. Like any commodity, shortages tend not to last very long: buyers will be priced out of the market (curtailing demand), while suppliers will find ways to create new labour capacity such as training new people (increasing supply). And sellers of services deal in a perishable commodity: time. Only in periods of very high demand will sellers press forward a negotiating advantage borne of tight supply. A billing day lost forever is strong incentive to a seller to do a deal. Whether a buyer engages for a utility service by contracting mercenaries (hired guns under the direction of the buyer) or by hiring an auxiliary (a partnership for delivery of the solution as a whole), the buyer has the upper hand when buying utility services. Or, perhaps, it is more accurate to say that the advantage is the buyer's to lose.
On consideration, Machiavelli wouldn't mind auxiliary forces when they're deployed for utility purposes. It is foolish to distract your best people with non-strategic pursuits.
But he would not approve the use of auxiliaries to achieve strategic solutions. The buyer of a strategic, unique, competitively differentiated solution must put more scrutiny on suppliers, navigate custom pricing, underwrite general and ambiguous risks, and has less certainty of the outcome and the business impact. The buyer will also be weighing intangible advantages in potential sellers, such as business domain or advanced technology knowledge. This makes for a small, opaque and poorly diversified market for any given strategic investment. This favors the seller.
By engaging auxiliary forces, the buyer can get a head start on a strategic solution. But then, it doesn't matter how you start, but how you finish.
A territory conquered by an auxiliary leaves the auxiliary with a strong negotiating position: as the saying goes, possession is nine-tenths of the law. The auxiliary force, in possession of the conquered land, can set terms for turning it over to the prince. This can also be true for strategic software investments. Strategic software doesn't end with a single act of delivery. It will need further investment and development. Their knowledge of the created software - the business domain, the code, the deployment scripts, and so forth - give the auxiliary force a familiarity of "the terrain" that the buyer simply doesn't have. This gives the auxiliary firm an outsized position of power to renegotiate terms with the buyer (e.g., usurious terms for ongoing development and maintenance), or to negotiate with firms who are competitors to the buyer to create a similar solution.
But what about intellectual property and contract laws? Don't they protect the buyer? When the focus shifts to contracts, it means both parties have brought in the lawyers. Lawyers are simply another type of armed force, one that can be both highly destructive and very costly. Lawyering-up simply escalates an arms race between the buyer and seller (or in Machiavelli's parlance, the prince and the auxiliary).
It's no surprise that Machiavelli concluded that auxiliary forces were not worth the risk in strategic undertakings. Anything of strategic importance to the prince must ultimately be done by the prince and his own forces.
This is an easy rule to write, but not an easy rule to live. Building a force (or in software terms, a team) capable of creating a strategic software solution requires world-class knowledge, experience, and facilities. It requires trained personnel and the ability to continue training. It requires the ability to recognize greatness and potential, and the ability to hire both. It requires innovation in tools, techniques and results.
It was Peter the Great's aspiration for Russia to have an ocean going navy. But he didn't start by emptying his treasury on local contractors to build his boats and hire people off the streets to serve as his officers. He studied English ship building and hired German Naval officers to train his officers and enlisted ranks. He invested in developing a capability. He played the long game to allow Russia to become a capable naval power, and not simply a nation with a floating armed force. When time permits, when one has the luxury of playing the long game of disruption, one can own, rather than rent, capability.
Time does not always permit the long game, especially in businesses whose models are being stampeded by software. If the competition has moved first, if one has to respond swiftly, one has no choice but to rely on auxiliaries or mercenaries if one is to continue to compete.
How best, then, for the buyer to engage an auxiliary or mercenary force, given Machiavelli's counsel? We'll look at the terms for this kind of an engagement in Part II.
